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MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, TRANSFER PRICES, AND TAXES:
EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
ABSTRACT
Economicresearchontransfer-pricing behavior by multinational corporadons has emphasized
theoretical modeling and institutional description. This paper presents the fiit .ystematic empirical
analysL of transfer prices, u.sing data from the petroleum industry. On the basLs of oil imported into
theUnitedStates over the period 1973 -1984,we test two propositions:
I) Are prices set by integrated companies for their internal transfers different from those pre'ailing
in arm 's-length (i.e., inter-company) trade, when other variables, such as oil quality, are controlled
for?
ii) Do average effective corporate income tar rates explain observed patterns of transfer pricing?
Regression analysis leads to the following conclusions:
i)Transfer and arm 's-length prices differ significantly for oil origznating in some cowthie but not
all.When multiplied by the relevant import volumes, these differences are relatively smalL The
revenue transferred through deviations from ann -length prices represents two percent or les.s of the
value of the caide oil imported by multinational companies each year.
ii) The observed differences between arm 's-length and transfer prices are not easily explained by
average effective tax rates in exporting countries.
Our results provide little support for the claim that multinational petroleum companies set their
transfer prices to evadetaxes. Weoffer severalhypothesesto explain our findings
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Introduction
Whenevergoods cross national borders within the channels of a multinational corporation
(MNC), a trarsfer price must be calculated for tax purposes. When corporate tax rates differ
on the two sides of the border, the MNC has an incentive to set itstrarsfer prices in a way so
as to reduce its tax burden by reporting higher profits in the countly where corporate profits are
taxed more lightly.
The ability of MNCs to set transfer prices to minimizetaxes,however, is circumscribed by the
tax regulations of the home and host countries. In the United States, Section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code requires that transfer prices for imports and exports of goods and
services be set equal to 'arm's-length prices.
Defining arm's-length prices' is often non-trivial. Unless the good transferred is perfectly
homogeneous and has a well-functioning arm's-length market, determination of arm's-lengtlf
prices will involve some arbitrariness. The process of determining arm's-length prices in
practice is one of negotiation with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. The numerous court
cases involving arm's-length pricing (LaMont 1975) is an indication that the process is not cut-
and-dried.
Allegation of abues of trarsfer pricing is widespread, where abuse" is very loosely defined as
a divergence between trarsfer prices and some notion of arm's-length prices. These allegations
are supported by some indirect evidence (L.all 1973, Vaitsos 1974, Jenkins and Wright 1975,
Roumeiotis 1977, Bertrand 1981), but there have been no direct comparisons of interaffiliatc
and arm's-length prices. This paper carries out such a study for the U.S. petroleum industry.
The main reason for choosing the petroleum industry is that data are available. The main
limitation in examining this industry is that its tax history, for both purely domestic companies2
andmultinationals, has been quite different in the United States from that of manufacturing.
Thus one should be extremely cautious in generalizing results from petroleum to other
industries.
Nevertheless, there is much to be said for examining petroleum, quite apart from data
availability. As seen in Table 1, in the last decade for which tax data are available, the oil and
gas industry has accounted for between one-third and two-thirds of US taxable income from
abroad, paid well over half of foreign taxes, and earned a similar fraction of the foreign tax
credits.Roughly speaking, thepetroleum industiy from this standpoint is about as large as all
other industries combined.
Table 1is also useful for obtaining a rough idea of the tax position of the industiy. From
column (5)theaverage foreign tax rate is vety high, more than double thatforother industries,
From column (6) the ratio of the foreign tax credit to US taxable income from abroad is very
close to the US statutory corporate tax rate, suggesting that there was little tax left to be paid at
home. From column (7), whereas other industries were able to utilize almost every dollar of
foreign tax paid to offset US taxes, the petroleum industiy was able to offset only half to three
quarters of its foreign taxes paid. These figures are averages across all countries; as discussed
below, situations vaiy from one country to the next.
The US petroleum industry has been alleged to be a notorious abuser of transfer pricing (see
e.g., U.S. Congress 1977, Bertrand 1981). In addition to purely political considerations, there
are at least three reasons for this.First, until the mid-1970s, US MNCs were permitted by the
IRS to treat virtually all payments to governments for oil abroad as foreign income taxes,
enabling the companies to deduct these costs directly from their US tax liabilities, rather than
from their taxable income.1 Their incentive was thus very strong to make these payments













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The second reason is the nature of the petroleum market Crude oil, a raw material, accounts
for most of the petroleum moving in international trade. Until the 1980s, there was virtually no
spot-auction market in crude oil (see Hubbard and Weiner 1989). The arm's-length market
was one of long-term contracts. Crude oil is not a homogeneous product, and contract terms
depend, inter alia, on its sulfur and gravity, size of ship transporting the cargo, and terms of
credit. In addition, as Hines (1988b) points out, the contractual relationship itself can have
value, e.g., in mitigating moral hazard problems (referred to in the contracting literature as
'opportunism;" see Williamson 1975).Moreover, the market for crude oil is not competitive,
but rather has been dominated by OPEC, a cartel whose power has waxed and waned over
time. Oligopolistic interaction among sellers is likely to lead to varying degrees of freight
absorption in markets with geographically-dispersed production, so that the arm's-length price
will depend on the exporting country and point of destination. In the case of petroleum, the
Atlantic and Pacific markets are particularly likely to differ, because moving the product
between them is quite costly.
The final reason is the sheer size of the industry. While crude oil is not perfectly homogeneous,
it is certainly more homogeneous than other products often cited for transfer-price abuse,e.a.,
pharmaceuticals. The scope for transfer-price manipulation is probably substantially smaller as
a percentage of ann's-length price, but when multiplied by the enormous volume of petroleum
moving in international trade, the revenue transferred, and tax avoided, is potentially great.
Suspicions of tax evasion through transfer-pricing by the industry have not been limited to
researchers and politicians. The US. Internal Revenue Service created a special unit, the
Petroleum Industry Program, in 1978 to monitor the industry, and inter alia, make
determinations regarding arm's-length prices. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
monitored transfer prices in the course of administering the regulatory program imposed on the7
domestic petroleum industry in the 1970s. Thismonitoringprocess is the source of the data
used in this study, which were required to be submitted to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA, the data-collection branch of DOE) by American companies that import
crude oil.
The approach in this paper is as follows. First, we use regression methods to isolate systematic
differences between third-party and interaffiiate prices, controlling for the factors discussed
above. One hypothesis we examine is whether the rise of the spot market and centralization of
IRS petroleum expertise at the end of the 1970s resulted in a reduced scope for creative
transfer-pricing. We then go on to relate these differences to the tax regimes of exporting
countries.
The data were obtained from EIA, which deleted any information that would allow
identification of individual firms. The data are described in some detail in Weiner (1986) and
Anderson (1988);2 the discussion here is limited to attributes salient to this paper. The data
cover the period October 1973 -October1984, a period that encompasses tremendous
variation in oil prices, changes in the structure of the petroleum industry, and tax rates. The
database contains information on dates of loading and importation, exporting country, port of
landing, f.o.b. and landed prices, sulfur and gravity, credit terms, volume, and transaction type
for cargoes of crude oil imported into the United States during this period.4 While some
previous analysts have concluded that the absence of a "market price" precludes assessment of
transfer-price manipulation (Rugman 1985), we are able to take advantage of this information
in the regression analysis, thereby correcting for much of the heterogeneity discussed above.8
Forour purposes, the most interesting aspect of the database is the breakdown of imports by
type of transaction--interaffiliate transfers (designated type A below) and arm's-length
purchases. The latter is further broken down into purchases directly from host governments
(type H),"third-party'purchases (purchases from other firms, designated type 7),andarm's-
length purchases with type of seller unreported (type U). The decline of the major
multinational oil companies and rise of state enterprises in oil-exporting countries is reflected
in the falling share over timc of interaffiliate transfers relative to arm's-length transactions.
The breakdown of transaction types for purchases from each oil-exporting countly is provided
for an illustrative year in Table 2.
Hypotheses Regarding Transfer Pricing
The hypotheses about transfer-price behavior are straightforward: Multinational petroleum
companies set transfer prices that differ from their arm's-length prices when they have the
incentive and the abifity to do so. Ceteris panbus, firmsthat produce crude oil in countries with
effective marginal corporate tax rates (tf) that exceed the rate in the United States (t) will
reduce their tax obligations by reporting transfer prices as low as possible. At the margin the
dollar in profit "lost" in the host country will reduce firms' tax obligations by t, while increasing
their US tax obligation by an amount<t1. Similarly, when >tf,firms have an incentive
to report greater profits in the host country, in order for as much of their revenue as possible to
be taxed at the lower rate abroad.
In practice, calculations of tax obligations are complicated by the fact that US MNC's must pay
US corporate tax on income earned by their foreign subsidiaries. In order to avoid double
taxation, the IRS allo US MNC's to credit foreign taxes paid against their US tax obligations.
In terms of this very simple model, the US MNC would owe US tax of tus -tfon the9
dollar of profit if >t. Ifthe foreign rate exceeds the US rate, the US MNCowesno tax to
the United States at the margin.
Whent> tf,US MNC's nonetheless have an incentive to report profits abroad because the
US tax owed is payable only when the profit is repatriated to the United States. By investing
theirprofitsabroad, US MNC's can thus defer their US tax obligations. When tf exceeds
the difference is an excess foreign tax credit, which the US MNC can carry forward against
future US tax obligations. Thus the incentives for transfer-price manipulation described above
are present even when foreign taxes are creditable against UStaxes.4a
Because the comparison we undertake is so straightforward, we do not present a formal
theoretical model of transfer pricing in this paper. A model that integrates some features of
the theoretical literature in this area can be found in Eden (1985), where it is demonstrated
that tariff rates, as well as corporate tax rates, can influence transfer-price decisions. In this
case, the United States has imposed a tariff on crude oil imports since 1973(when it switched
from a quota). The tariff is very small however ($0.20/barrel, corresponding to a rate of
roughly one percent), and is neglected in our analysis.
Of course, transfer prices serve purposes other than reduction of tax obligations, e.g., providing
signals for managerial incentives within the firm (see Eccles 1985). These other considerations
will confound efforts to examine hypotheses regarding tax factors only if they vary
systematically with tax rates, which appears unlikely.
The scope for multinational firms to set transfer prices so as to minimize their tax obligations is
constrained by the tax regulations of their home and host countries, and by the ability of the tai
authorities to enforce these regulations. In the United States, the relevant regulation is Section10
TABLE 2
Number of Transactions by type, 1981
TYPE OF TRANSACTION
COUNTRY H T A OTHER TOTAL
ABU DHABI 2 7 60 0 69
ALGERIA 18 73 150 1 242
ANGOLA 0 10 20 0 30
BRUNEI 0 11 0 0 11
CAMEROON 0 12 14 0 26
CANADA 0 13 145 0 158
CHINA 0 2 0 0 2
CONGO 0 23 0 0 23
DUBAI 5 0 4 0 9
ECUADOR 6 5 19 0 30
EGYPT 2 1 11 0 14
GABON 0 5 26 0 31
INDONESIA 24 94 196 0 314
IRAQ 4 0 0 0 4
LIBYA 32 55 125 3 215
MALAYSIA 0 4 15 0 19
MEXICO 232 38 342 2 614
NEUTRAL ZONE 0 0 25 0 25
NIGERIA 26 181 218 4 429
NORWAY 8 75 60 1 144
OMAN 0 13 7 0 20
PERU 3 6 12 0 21
QATAR 3 3 0 0 6
SAUDI ARABIA 0 162 592 4 758
SHARJAH 0 0 6 0 6
SYRIA 2 1 0 0 3
TRINIDAD 3 27 97 0 127
UNITED KINGDOM 17 56 92 2 167
VENEZUELA 100 83 117 2 302
ZAIRE 0 0 23 0 23
UNKNOWN 12 52 66 0 130
TOTAL 499 1012 2442 19 3972
(%) (13) (25) (61) (1) (100)11
482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires that transfer pricesbe set at arm's-length.
The regulations acknowledge the difficulty often involved in theestablishment of arm's-length
prices. Section 482 specifies that if 'comparable' third-party transactionsexist, then they must
be used in determining arm's-length prices, Firms have considerablediscretion in deciding
what constitutes "comparable,' however. In the event that no comparabletransactions exist,
firms are instructed to choose, in descending hierarchy, the "resale price'method (which uses
downs.;am m's-length prices to impute upstream transfer prices), the "cost-plus"method, or
any other pricing method that can be justified tothe IRS.5UsingFederal Trade Commission
(FTC) line-of-business data for 1975, Benvignati (1985) estimated that 24 percentof transfer-
prices set for goods exported from the United States to affiliates abroad wereestablished using
the comparable-third-party and resale-price methods, 57 percentusing the cost-plus method,
and 19 percent using other methods. Unfortunately, the FTC datado not cover interaffiliate
imports into the United States. In contrast, the breakdown for interaffiliatetransfers within the
United States (where tax considerations do not enter) in 1975 was 49 percentcomparable-third-
party and resale-price methods, 29 percent cost-plus method, 22 percentother methods.
'The null hypothesis here is that the US tax authorities are sufficientlyknowledgeable about the
arm's-length market in crude oil, and sufficiently capable at enforcingtransfer-price
regulations, that MNC's are obliged to set the prices for their interaffiliate transactionsequal to
prices prevailing for third-party transactions. As noted above theheterogeneity of the product
and third-party contract terms will tend to complicate efforts toestablish arm's-length prices
with which to compare a firm's transfer prices. However, IRS enforcementof the arm's-length
yardstick need not be perfect to deter the practice of using transferprices to avoid taxes. As
detailed in Robbins and Stobaugh (1973), there are many channels throughwhich MNC's can
shift funds between affiliates besides trade transactions, includingdividend payments, loans,
service fees and overhead charges, and royalties. Depending on the costsof doing so, MNC's12
may choose one or more of these other channels as a means of shifting profits among tax
jurisdictions.
In addition to testing for differences between arm's-length and transfer prices, we examine
below the hypothesis that MNC's transfer funds between tax jurisdictions by charging
themselves above- or below-market rates of interest on their credit transactions. The effective
interest rates charged are imputed from the sensitivity of f.o.b. prices to credit terms. The
higher the effective interest rate, the more should an increase in the number of days credit raise
the purchase price. In other words, the effective interest rate rises with d(price)/d(creditdays).
Thehypothesis here is that U.S. multinationals would like their affiliates in countries with
relatively low marginal corporate tax rates to "charge' high interest rates on their transfers to
affiliates in countries where such rates are relatively high, thereby transferring income to
jurisdictions where it is taxed more lightly. Effective interest rates are of course unobservable,
but this hypothesis can nonetheless be tested using a two-step procedure similar to the one
mentioned above for prices. The first step is a comparison of regression coefficients for
d(price)/d(credit days) for arm's-length and interaffiliate transactions, in order to locate
significant differences. The second is to relate any such differences to tax rates abroad. If
MNC's are transferring funds in this manner, the correlation between foreign tax rates and
excess" effective interest rates, as measured by d/(price)/d (credit days) jnteraffjljate -
d(price)/d(creditdayS)11jrdpa, should be negative.
The statistical work below constitutes the first systematic test of the effectiveness of transfer-
price regulations. Scattered indirect evidence suggests that the IRS is active in attempting to
enforce Section 482. Plasschaert (1979) reports that in 1968-69, the IRS investigated 871 cases
of international interaffihiate transactions. The largest number (roughly a third of the total) of13
potential adjustments concerned transfer prices in trade transactions. Only 26.9 percent of the
adjustments were actually implemented, but those that were implemented involved fairly laige
dollar figures. According to Plasschaert, two-thirds of the firms surveyed by the Conference
Board in 1970 and 1971 has been subject to adjustments under Section 482.
Empirical Tests
Ourobjectives for the empirical work are three. First, we want to determine whether
interaffiliate prices and third-party prices differ significantly, both in an economic and a
statistical sense, and whether any such differences vary systematically over time. Second, we
wish to identify the exporting countries, if any, that exhibit such differences. Our final desire is
to relate any country-specific differences we find to tax rates in oil-exporting countries.
The approach we adopt is as follows. We conduct OLS regressions with the purchase price as
the dependent variable. Crude oil transactions have traditionally been conducted on an f.o.b.
basis, and with a few exceptions, our purchase price data aie quoted f.o.b. point ofexport.6 To
control for any systematic differences in prices caused by factors other than the relationship
between parties in the transaction, the following explanatory variables were included: gravity,
sulfur content, size of shipment, and dummy variables for spot transactions, port of entryinto
the United States (East and Gulf Coasts, West Coast, Hawaii, Guam, and unknown), and credit
terms.
Separate regressions were run for each yeai, both because the effect of the control variables on
price is likely to vary with changing conditions in the oil market over time, and because we aie
interested in changes over time in differences between third-party and transfer prices, for the
reasons discussed above.7 A dummy variable was used for each loaiing month tocontrol for
intrayear fluctuations in oil prices.14
To conduct hypothesis tests, we include separate dummy variables for each transaction type
(interaffihiate transfer, third-party purchase, host-government purchase) for each country that
exported crude oil to the United States in a given year.8 We test whether the regression
coefficients for third-party transactions and interaffiliate transfers are equal for each exporting
country. In equation form, the null hypothesis is-ajj=0,1 =1, •,qjwhere tj and ajj are
the regression coefficients on the third-party and interaffiliate dummy variables for country i in
the regression for year j,andq is the number of countries that exported crude oil to the United
States in year j through both these transaction types.
The standard technique for testing the null hypothesis that the qj length vector-aj=0is to
construct an F ratio based on the squared errors from the constrained (the constraints being the
equality of all the t and a coefficients) and the unconstrained regressions. Here we instead use
the Bonferroni t test (as described in Savin 1980), which rejects the null hypothesis at the a
level if any of the qjvalues for the difference in coefficients exceeds the ta criticalpointin
absolute value. The reasons for using the Bonferronitest are two. First, the standard F test
can reject the null hypothesis at the a level even when none of the-coefficientsdiffer
significantly from zero at the a level, a result that is not meaningful here, because we are
prthiarily interested not in whether the restrictions are accepted universally, but rather in where
the violations of these restrictions arise. The second reason is that the Bonferronitest
indicates which of the coefficients in the vector tj -ajcause the rejection of the null hypothesis
when it is rejected, whereas the F test does not.
The difficulty with the Bonferronitest is that the distribution of the test statistic B =malj
I
isnot easily calculated because the f are not independent. It should be intuitively clear,
however, that rejection of the null hypothesis at thelevel entails using a critical fvalueat a
level smaller than a if more than onevalue is being calculated. Although the exact15
distribution of Bwill notingeneralbeknown,Savin(1980)shows that usinga critical level of
a/qjfor the qj individual tj'swill resultinthe test'srejectingthe null hypothesis at a level ￿e.9
In this paper weusethe levels a =.05 anda =.10; ourqj's vary from year toyearbutare
around20 exporters, so that the individualt-statisticsmust exceed thecritical value(forthe
two-tailed test witha large numberof degreesoffreedom, so thatweuse thestandard normal
distributionto approximate)tçp =3.03, tçjj2.81.
Canadaistreatedseparately onthe grounds that Canadiancrude oilshipmentsenterthe
UnitedStatesviapipeline, primarily in theNorth-Centralregion (Indianato Montana), where
there is relatively littleimmediatecompetition with other foreignsourcesof crude oil, which
are shipped bytankertothe U.S.East,West,ofGulfCoastsj0 Otherwise, the same regression
modelisappliedtoCanadiandata.
An illustrativeexample for1981 of the overallregressionresults appearsin Table 3. The
dummy variableshavebeen chosen so that the constant represents the average price paid to the
Venezuelan government for crudeoilshipped totheEast coastduring themonthofJanuary
withzero credit days.API gravity and sulfur contenthavetheexpectedpositive and negative
signs respectively. This resultis quiterobustovertime. Volume orsizeofshipment displaysan
expected negativesigndueto sizediscount, however thisresult is far from robust asthe
coefficients turn out to be significantly positivefora numberofyears. As expected,thespot
transaction variable yields a mixture of positive and negative signs over the sample period.
Although this is not the case in 1981, oil delivered to the West coast is usually significantly
cheaper than to the East coast due to the aIded cost of moving oil south of Africa, or through
the Panama Canal. The dummy variables for loading month display a pattern of falling prices.
The variable for credit days was introduced in the years for which data areavailable (1979
to 1984) with the intent of measuring an implicit interest rate acrosstransaction types, as16
TABLE 3
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1981
Dependent variable: PURCHASE PRICE
Number of obse,vation. =2942
adjustedR2=.787
EXPLANATORY ESTIMATED STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC
CONSTANT 29.738 0.462 64.331
GRAVITY 0.152 0.011 13.606
SULFUR -1.610 0.076 -21.225
VOLUME -0.326 0.129 -2.533
SPOT -0.791 0.331 -2.390
Transactiontype T
ABUDHABI 6.710 0.813 8.252
ALGERIA 3.298 0.468 7.047
ANGOLA 1.198 0.714 1.679
BRtJNEI 3.404 0.750 4.536
CAMEROON 4.547 0.654 6.953
CHINA -2.384 1.551 -1.537
CONGO 2.204 0.631 3.494
ECUADOR 2.627 0.948 2.772
EGYPT 6.638 2.032 3.267
GABON 2.648 0.990 2.676
INDONESIA 1.551 0.431 3.601
LIBYA 3.454 0.444 7.780
MALAYSIA 2.406 1.098 2.192
MEXICO 3.736 0.514 7.269
NIGERIA 4.048 0.367 11.020
NORWAY 3.710 0.424 8.75917
TABLE3 (continued)
EXPLANATORY ESTIMATED STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC
OMAN 4.723 0.677 6.980
PERU 4.440 0.896 4.955
QATAR 2.994 1.209 2.477
SAUDI ARABIA 3.657 0.331 11.034
SYRIA 8.557 2.030 4.216
TRINIDAD 3.240 0.480 6.753
UNITED KINGDOM 3.060 0.437 6.995
VENEZUELA 2.391 0.324 7.370
Transactiontype A
ABUDHABI 3.313 0.441 7.504
ALGERIA 3.859 0.406 9.496
ANGOLA 3.274 0.568 5.763
CAMEROON 4.357 0.742 5.873
DUBAI 5.501 1.059 5.195
ECUADOR 2.294 0.553 4.146
EGYPT 3.095 0.693 4.464
GABON 2.812 0.502 5.598
INDONESIA 2.262 0.378 5.985
LIBYA 5.481 0.374 14.640
MALAYSIA 5.564 0.629 8.852
MEXICO 5.047 0.286 17.642
NEUTRAL ZONE 5.856 0.482 12.159
NIGERIA 4.894 0.348 14.059
NORWAY 3.718 0.534 6.962
OMAN 4.825 1.452 3.323
PERU 3.806 0.651 5.844
SAUDI ARABIA 2.350 0.316 7.44818
TABLE3 (continued)
EXPLANATORY ESTIMATED STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC
SHARJAH 1.604 1.209 1.326
TRINIDAD 6.641 0.373 17.784
UNITED KINGDOM 3.312 0.393 8.436
VENEZUELA -0.316 0.444 -0.712
ZAIRE 2.710 0.626 4.328
Transactiontype H
ABUDHABI 3.272 1.461 2.239
ALGERIA 3.875 0.679 5.707
DUBAI 6.576 1.042 6.313
ECUADOR 2.342 0.867 2.700
EGYPT 4.111 1.454 2.827
INDONESIA 2.069 0.648 3.194
IRAQ 8.644 1.057 8.175
LIBYA 6.850 0.508 13.476
MEXICO 5.206 0.294 17.729
NIGERIA 4.753 0.575 8.262
NORWAY 5.160 0.962 5.365
PERU 0.857 1.199 0.715
QATAR 9.943 2.034 4.889
TRINIDAD 3.179 1.455 2.185
UNITED KINGDOM 4.135 0.599 6.906
Transactiontype U
ALLCOUNTRIES 4.226 0.975 4.33319
TABLE3 (continued)
EXPLANATORY ESTIMATED STANDARD
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC
Portof entry
HAWAII 1.358 0.381 3.564
GUAM 2.206 0.401 5.507
USA 0.392 0.171 2.297
WEST -0.109 0.236 -0.461
UNKNOWN -0.773 0.471 -1.639
1\Jumberofcredit days
0-9 0.504 0.598 0.842
10 -0.191 0.229 -0.833
11-29 -0.936 0.272 -3.443
30 -0.105 0.101 -1.042
31-59 2.575 0.407 6.324
60 0.773 0.583 1.327
61-179 3.060 0.467 6.547
180 or more -0.168 0.196 -0.856
Loadingmonth
FEBRUARY 0.219 0.188 1.170
MARCH 0.036 0.178 0.202
APRIL -0.372 0.181 -2.054
MAY -0.546 0.184 -2.969
JUNE -1.680 0.185 -9.098
JULY -1.992 0.187 -10.634
AUGUST -2.305 0.179 -12.864
SEPTEMBER -2.555 0.188 -13.593
OCTOBER -2.606 0.190 -13.716
NOVEMBER -2.373 0.195 -12.162
DECEMBER -2.195 0.188 -11.67520
TEST FOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIRD-PARTYAND AFFILL4 TE PRICES
ESTIMATED STANDARD
COUNTRIES COEFFICIENT ERROR T-STATISTIC
ABU DHABI 3.397 0.821 4.135a
ALGERIA -0.561 0.361 -1.554
ANGOLA -2.077 0.800 -2.596
CAMEROON 0.190 0.895 0.212
ECUADOR 0.334 1.024 0.326
EGYPT 3.543 2.112 1.678
GABON -0.164 1.026 -0.159
INDONESIA -0.711 0.294 -2.416
LIBYA -2.027 0.362 •55948
MALAYSIA -3.158 1.171 -2.697
MEXICO -1.311 0.468 2•803b
NIGERIA -0.846 0.249 -3.404
NORWAY -0.008 0.485 -0.016
OMAN -0.102 1.547 -0.066
PERU 0.634 1.028 0.616
SAUDI ARABIA 1.307 0.229 5.715a
TRINIDAD -3.401 0.463 7.348a
UNITED KINGDOM -0.252 0.396 -0.638
VENEZUELA 2.708 0.443 6.117a
Note: a and b indicate significance levels of 5% and 10%,
respectively, according to the Bonferroni test, i.e.
greater than 3.00 and 2.79, respectively, in absolute
value.21
explainedabove. Unfortunately no coherent inference can be made, as can be seen from the
1981 result.It was expected that the average purchase price increases with the number of
credit days due to the implicit loan. Furthermore, affiliates may want to charge implicit interest
rates different from market interest rates in order to realize money transfers. Unfortunately,
the data reveal no definite pattern in this respect, although some coefficients of the variables
for credit days are statistically significant.
The last group of explanatory variables is based on transaction type by country.It yields the
annual average price differential associated with the type of transaction. Table 3 shows that
with two exceptions, crude oil sold by the Venezuelan government was the cheapest crude oil
imported into the US. Using the estimated coefficients reported in Table 3 and the
estimated variance-covariance matrix, the average price differential between third-party and
affiliate transactions is calculated for each country along with the pertinent standard error and
t-statistic. The results are reproduced at the bottom of Table 3. A positive value implies that
prices for transactions through afffliates were lower than those for transactions througii third
parties. A negative value implies the converse. Recalling the discussion above, differentials
motivated by tax considerations should be positive. Table 3 shows that the two prices were
statistically different at the 5percentsignificance level for Abu Dhabi, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, Trinidad and Venezuela, and at the 10 percent level for Mexico, but that only three of
the significant differentials have the sign predicted by the tax-motivationhypothesis.1 la
Table 4 provides a swnmaiy of the results from the annual regressions. Only the average price
differentials which are statistically significant at the 10 percent level areshown.12 No price
differential is statistically significant in 1983, so the null hypothesis of no difference is not
rejected for that year according to the Bonferroni procedure. The null hypothesis isrejected
for all other years. Countries are separated into two groups withthe first including major
exporting countries which contributed 5percentor more of all US crude oil imports in a















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ifattention is centered on the major oil exporting countries only, it is possible toobserve
specific patterns over time and for individual countries. From 1973 to 1975,when major oil
exporting countries had yet to nationalize completely their oil production, all averageprice
differentials were negative with one exception, Algeria in 1973. From 1982 to 1984, all price
differentials are positive, with Indonesia in 1984 being the single exception. Between these two
periods, the results are mixed. At the individual country level, Indonesia shows negative price
differentials for all years, with 1978 being the only exception. Saudi Arabia has only positive
price differentials, while Venezuela has negative price differentials before nationalization,in
1973 and 1974, and positive price differentials from 1979 to 1984 after nationalization.It
should be pointed out that average price differentials were unusually largein favor of
interaffiliate transactions in 1979.13 This can be explained by the 1979 oil price surge,with
interaffihiate prices being adjusted slowly.
When prices are higher for transactions through affiliates than prices through third parties
(assumed to represent market prices), or in other words, when price differentiais are negative,
money is transferred from the United States to othercountries. The converse occurs with
positive price differentials. To get an idea of the relative importance of these money transfers
within affiliated parties, the statistically significant differences in prices reported in Table 4
were multiplied by the number of barrels imported byaffiliated parties. The results appear in
Table 5,whichalso shows the total value of oil imported by affiliated parties and of all oil
imports. With the exception of the first two years and the last one, more money was flowing
into the US than out. The gross money transfer represents less than 2 percent of the value of
crude oil imported into the US by affiliated parties, with 1979 being an exception, and an even
smaller percentage of all crude oil imports.
The database includes information on both the purchase price and the price of oil at the port of29
ently, the difference being transportation costs.There is no information on the ownership of
tankers (or pipelines) carrying crude oil to the American portof entry, nor is there information
about whichcountriesultimately received the money spent on transportation.Nevertheless,
transportation fees form another channel which couidbe used to transfer money into or out of
the US. th spite of the incomplete information, ananalysis similar to that described above for
crude oil prices was applied to transportation costsin order to test whether the latter differ
between third-piate transactions.14
Table 6 displays the summaiy results with respect todifferences between transportation costs of
third-party and affiliate transactions. No systematicdifferences over the years seem evident,
but some individual countries display definite patterns:Algeria (positive), Iran (negative),
Libya (positive), Mexico (positive), SaudiArabia (negative), Angola (positive), Egypt
(negative), and Norway (positive). Table 7 showsthe money transfers that result from affiliates
paying significantly different transportation coststhan third parties. These transfers represent
less than one percent of the value of oilimported into the US by affiliatedparties.15
Tax effects
Asshown in Table 4 and Table 6, third-partyand interaffiliate purchase price and
transportation cost differentials display specific patternsfor some countries. What are the
relationships between these estimated patternsand the host countly tax regimes? Oil taxation
in each country of interest arid its evolution overtime are highly complex and cannot easily be
summarized in a few generalstatements.16 Furthermore it is quite difficult to put together a
set of statistical information onthis matter which displays consistency overtime. Since our
interest lies in transfer pricing betweenaffiliated parties, our objective is to find an indicator of
the fiscal treatment granted to anadditional dollar of oil production income by hostcountries.30
Thehigber is the marginal oil income tax rate, the greater is the incentive to reduce reporteJ
taxable income in a particular country, regardless of whether the marginal tax rate is higher
than the home country (US) tax rate.17 Since marginal tax rates are not reaiily available, we
have to rely on average effective tax rates prevailing abroad. The average effective income tax
rate is defined as the ratio of income tax paid or accrued to taxable income based on measures
which would normally be acceptable to the Interval Revenue Service. The average effective
income tax rate may be a poor indicator of the marginal rate when the latter is increasing
(understatement) or decreasing (overstatement).It is possible to have a situation where the
average tax rate is high and the marginal rate is nil, as was the case when the income tax paid
was based on the posted prices.18
Average effective income tax rates are displayed in Table 8, but should be interpreted with
great care. The main statistical sources are as follows. The tax and income data for even years
up to 1982 are taken from various issues of Statistics of Income put out by IRS; the data for
1977 and 1982 come from the benchmark survey of the US Department of Commerce on US
direct investment abroad. Smith (1987) presents a few figures for 1983, and finally, some
judgment was applied to make interpolations or extrapolations. We are left with a number of
missing observations. The salient feature of the average effective tax rates asshownin Table 8
is that they are high, both in absolute terms, and relative to US statutory mcome tax rates over
thesameperiod. 19 Furthermore, the effective income tax rate of US parents of foreign oil
affiliates, computed in a similar fashion, was0.30in 1982 only Mexico was characterized by a
lower figure. No overall time trends are evident; some countries, such asCanada,Egypt, and


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Empirical Results: Relationships between Third-Party/Affiliate Differentials and Tax Rates
1980 -1984
DEPENDENTVARIABLE: PIJRCHASE-PRICE DIFFERENTIAL DIVIDED BY ITS STANDARD ERR
VariabLe











Mo. of Observations = 66 R20.0054(adj)= -0.0256
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TRANSPORTATION-COST DIFFERENTIAL DIVIDED BY ITS STANDARD ERR
Variable
ICoefficient Std Err T-stat







No. of Observations = 66 R20.0385(adj)0.0085
1973 - 1978
DEPENDENTVARIABLE: PiJRCHASEPRICE DIFFERENTIAL DIVIDED BY ITS STANDARD ERR
Variable Coefficient Std Err T-stat Signf
I I I I
C1STANT 0.573028E-010.677641E-01 j0.845622 0.400
TAX RATE -038&491E-010.773865E-01 0.619
No. of Observations 78 R20.0186(adj)-0.0073
DEPENDENT VARIABLE2 TRANSPTATI1-COCT DIFFERENTIAL DIVIDED BY ITS STANDARD ERR
Variabe Coefficient Std Err T-stat Signf





No. of servations 78 R2z0.0909(adj)0.0669
RANKCORRELATIONS FOR 1976 (22 observations)
VariabesCorreatS Spearinan Rank
Correation Coefficient
p.jrchase-price-differentia coefficient/startard error, .339
tax rate/purchase-price-differentiaL st.ndard error
transportation-cost-differential coefficient/staSard error, •.145
tax rateítransportation.cottdifferetitiat standard error33
What is the relationship between third-party and interaffiliate purchase price and
transportation cost differentials, on the one hand, and the average effective income tax ates
on the other? For purchase price, the transfer-pricinghypothesis states that interaffiliates
would like to set a lower price in high-tax host countries relative to third-party transactions,
hence generating high positive price differentials. As for transportation cost, a high effective
tax rate should induce integrated cornpames to take income out of theoil-producing host
country, possibly into the home countiy, or more likely into a tax-haven countly 'rouflag-
of-convenience shipping affiliate. This would result in more of the oil acquisition cost being in
the form of transportation cost, and hence increase transportation cost relative to third parties.
Along with these two transfer pricing hypotheses, our objective is to check whether significant
structural breaks occurred between the early part of the sampling period and the latter part,
when a number of oil-producing countries had taken over oil production, and when the iRS
improved its ability to monitor US oil companies operating abroad.
To test for the influence of effective income tax rates on affiliate pricingbehavior, and for
possible structura' changes, regressions were run with average effective tax rate as the
explanatory variable, and differentials between third-party and affiliate prices (as shown, e.g., at
the end of table 3) as the dependent variable, for two subperiods, 1975 to 1978 and1980 to
1984.21 Eachobservationis weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the estimated
third party/affiliate differential to take into account the precision of the information. Only
observations for which tax rates and estimated price differentials are both available are used.
Table 9 presents the summary regression results. The relationship between the two sets of
variables is at best tenuous. There appears to be no significant relationship betweenthird-party
and affiliate estimated purchase price differentials and averageeffective income tax rates in34
both subperiods. Estimated transportation cost differentials, on the other hand, show the
predicted negative relationship with tax rates, significantly so in the first subperiod, and a
weaker relationship in the second one. To probe this relationship further, attention was
centered on the year 1976, which had the most extensive set of information on individual-
country effective oil income-tax rates. Spearmanrankcorrelations between third-party and
affiliate estimated purchase price (transportation cost) differentials and effective income tax
rates22 were computed in an attempt to reduce the influence of measurement :rrors. The
price differential/effective income tax rate rank correlation yields, as predicted, a positive
value, 0.34, with a standard error of 0.23, while the transportation cost/effective income tax rate
rank correlation is, also as predicted, negative, equal to -0.14 with the same standard error.
The first estimated rank correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10
percent level, while the second is not.23 Taken together, the regression and rank correlation
results provide on'y very weak support for an influence of effective income tax rate on transfer
prices between affiliated parties.
ConchLsion
In eneraI, multinational corporations can reduce their tax obligations by setting transfer prices
thai differ from arm's-length prices. Their ability to do so is constrained by tax regulations in
their home and host countries. The effectiveness of these regulations, however, is not easily
determined.
In this paper, we have conducted the first systematic empirical analysis of transfer prices. The
industry we have studied, petroleum, has a long history of tax-motivated transfer pricing. Even
after the changes in the tax treatment of the industry in the mid-1970s, there have been
allegations of transfer-price abuse, but little in the way of hard evidence.35
Ourfindings indicate that there are systematic differences between transfer and arm's-length
prices for many exporting countries. Sortie of these countries exhibit consistent patterns over
time, but others do not. Moreover, the relationship between transfer-price/arm's-length-price
differentials and corporate tax rates appears to be weak.Thereare at least four possible
hypotheses for this.First, the nature and enforcement of IRS regulations may be so effective
that compallies are precluded frcjm reducing their tax obligations through transfer pricing.
Second, it may be much easier to avoid taxes through the other channels discussedabove.
Third, transfer prices may serve a primarily managerial role within the firm, asdescribed by
Eccles (1985) and Robbins and Stobaugh(1973)24 Finally, marginal and average effective tax
rates may be sufficiently different as to preventidentification of any relationship between the
former and transfer-pricing behavior. These hypotheses are not all mutually exclusive,and
untangling theni is urHikely to prove easy. While this study represents a stepin the empirica]
analysis of transfer pricing,tisdear that much work remains to be done in this area.
NOTES
1.Briefly, this practice arose out of U.S. foreign policy goals in the Middle Eastfollowing
World War II. The practice began with the establishment of an income tax onpetroleum-
company profiis by Saudi Arabia in 1950. TheU.S. Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling
accepting the. deductibility of this tax against U.S. income ta in 1955.In the 1960s market
prices for crude oil declined,buttransfer prices, called poted, or tax-reference, prices (used
in determining petroleum companies taxes paid to oil-producingcountries) did not, effective'y
increasing transfers form the U.S. Treasury to foreign governments(for details see U.S.
Coness 1977; for an economic analysis see Jenkins and Wright 1975).
In the rnid1970s foreign crude-oil reserves (except in Canada) werenationalized, limiting the
ability of U.S. multinationals to claim payrnms to foreign governments ascreditable against
U.S. income tax. The rules on deductibility of foreign taxes weretightened by the U.S. Tax
Reduction Act of 1975 and Tax Reform Act of 1976. McDaniel and Ault(1977) summarize
these changes.
2. The primary use of the data in Anderson (1988) was toadjust crude oil import prices for
quality. Weiner (1986) used the data to test hypotheses aboutcontracting and spot trading.36
3.Reporting of the data by firms that import crude oil into the United States is mandatory
under the U.S. Federal Administration Act (1974) and the U.S. Energy Policyand
Conservation Act (1975), which were part of the basis for U.S. domestic crude oil price
regulation. We were unable to find out whether these data were thesame as those reported to
the IRS. However, these regulations did not provide an incentive for misreporting transfer
prices of imported crude oil (see Kalt 1981 for a description and analysis of U.Spetroleum
regulation in the 1970s), and it appears unlikely that MNCs maintainedseparate accounting
systems for the Department of Energy in addition to their tax and managerial systems.
Since the U.S. deregulation of crude oil prices in 1981, the data have been collectedfor
statistical purposes only. The reporting form was not changed until late 1984, after which the
information we use here was no longer requested.
4.Firms are not required to report in months in which they import less than 500 thousand
barrels into the United States.In comparison, crude oil imports into the United States
averaged roughly 200 million barrels per month during this period. The databasecovers
approximately 90 percent of U.S. crude oil imports.
4a. The MNC's US tax credits and liabilities cannot be deferred when its foreign affiJiatesare
organized as branches, rather than separately incorporated abroadas subsidiaries. Most US
petroleum MNCs organize their foreign operations as branches, implying that the transfer-price
incentive discussed in the text is relevant only when tf > t. As indicated below, this is always
the case in our data.
5.Fora more detailed description, see Plasschaert (1979).
6. The database contains landed as well as f.o.b. prices. Shipments for which thetwo prices
were equal were assumed to change hands on a c,i.f. basis, and were not used in the regressions.
7. Shipments that loaded in one year and landed in the next were counted in the loadingyear.
An alternative to conducting annual regressions would have been to runone regression with
interaction terms to allow for changes over time. The database containsso many observations
(see Table 4) that there is little to be gained form pooling years for additional degrees of
freedom.
8. Not every country exported through every transaction type every year. Dummy variablesare
omitted in cases where no transactions from a given country of a given type exist.37
8a. If the transaction type itself is an endogenous choice based on tax considerations, the
coefficient estimates may be biased. To test for endogeneity, we performed a logit analysis,
using transaction type as the dependent variable, and effective tax rates (described below) as
explanatory variables. The test revealed no significant relationships bet'een transaction type
and country-specific effective tax rates.
9. This result comes from applying the Bonferrom inequality P(E1 Em) ￿ 1 -mP(E4),
where Ej stands for event i, and E for the complement of event 1.As an example, suppose
the events E1, E2 are that the t statistics associated with two regression coefficients are in the
acceptance region for the null hypothesis. Then the ￿.05 level test of both being in the
acceptance region is that each is in the .025 acceptance region. In comparison, if the two
statistics are independent, then the exact distribution of B can be calculated; a .025 level test on
each coefficient is equivalent to a 1 -(1-.025)2=.0494level test of the null hypothesis.
10. The null hypothesis that Canadian data fit the overall regression is rejected at conventional
significance levels.
11. The exceptions are China (transaction type I) and Venezuela (transaction type A), but
neither is statistically significant at conventional levels.
ha. It has been suggested that type A prices may follow type H prices closely, which would
indicate that affiliates' prices merely follow those set by their host government. The Bonferroni
test rejects at the five percent level the hypothesis of no price differential between transaction
types A and H.
12. In a dition, the differences that are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level
are so indicated.
13. Malaysia is the exception.
14. These regressions omit the explanatory variables API gravity, sulfur, and credit days.
15. The result that the United States has received relatively small net inflows differs markedly
from that of Jenkins and Wright (1975) for the period bcfore our data start.
16. See Kemp (1987).
17. See the discussion earlier in the paper. For a summaly of U.S. taxation of incomeearned
abroad, see Hines (1988a).38
18. See U.S. Congress (1977).
19. Average effective tax rates greater than one reflect the fact that the tax baseused by the
IRSfor foreign operations of U.S. companies differs from the tax base as defmed by other
governments.
20. U.S. Department of Commerce (1985) Table iii.M.1.
21.As can beseen in Table 4, the price differentials for 1979 are very large. This is in part due
to the disruption in the oil market, which resulted in rapid price changes. Since the
differentials were almost certainly affected, we have dropped 1979 from the regressions.
22. Taking into account the standard error of the estimated differentials.
23. The approximate distribution for order statistics suggested by Kendall and Stuart (1960),
section 31.19, is used to obtain the critical value.
24. This hypothesis requires the additional, questionable assumption that it is too costly for the
MNC to maintain separate accounting systems for managerial and tax purposes.
REFERENCES
Anderson, J.M., "Empirical Analysis of World Oil Tra1e, 1967-1984,' in G. Horwich and D.L
Weimer, eds., ResponduzgtoInternationalOil Crises,Washington: AEI, 1988.
Benvignati, A.M., An Empirical Investigation of International Transfer Pricing by US
Manufacturing Firms,' in AM. Rugman and L Eden, eds., MultinationaLs and Trws-fer Ficing,
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985.
Bertrand, R.J., The State of Competition in the Canadian Petroleum Indust,y, Volume III,
International Linkages: Canada and the World Petroleum Market, Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1981.
Eccies, R.G., The Transfer Prichzg Problem: A Theory for Practice, Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1985.
Eden, L., 'The Microeconomics of Transfer Pricing,' in A.M. Rugman and L. Eden, eds.,
MultinationaLs and Transfer Pricing, New York: St. Martin's Press, 198539
Hines, J.R., "Taxation andU.S.Multinational Investment, Tax Poliy and the Economy 2,
1988a
__________"Wherethe Profits Are: On the Taxation of Transfers by Multinational Firms,"
paperpresented to the National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute, 1988b.
Hubbard, R.G., and R.J. Weiner, "Contracting and Price Adjustment in Commodity Markets:
Evidence from Copper and Oil," Revie of Economics and Stathtics, February 1989.
Jenkins, G.P., and B.D. Wright, 'Taxation of Income of Multinational Corporations: The Case
of the United States Petroleum Industry,' Review of &ononucs and Statx.s'tics, February 1975.
Kalt, J.P., The Economics and Politics of Oil Price Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981.
Kemp, A., Petroleum Rent Collection Around the World, Halifax: Institute for Research on
Public Policy, 1987.
Kendall, MG., and A. Stuart, The AdvancedTheory of Statistics,2nd ed., Vol. 2, London:
Griffin and Co., 1960.
Lall, S.,'Transfer Pricing by Multinational Manufacturing Firms,' Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics, August 1973.
LaMont,H.,"Multinational Enterprise, Transfer Pricing, and the 482 Mess," Columbia fownal
ofTransnationalLaw #3, 1975.
McDaniel, P.R., and Hi. Ault, Introduction to United States Inleinational Taiatwn, Deventer,
Netherlands: Kluwer, 1977.
Plasschaert, S.R.F., Transfer Pricing and Multinational Corporwions, New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1979.
Robbins, S.M.,andRB. Stobaugh, Money in the Multinational Eiueipri.se, New York: Basic
Books, 1973.
Roumeliotis,P., "La Politique des Prix d'Importation et d'Exportation des Enterprises
Multinationales en Grèce,' Revue Tiers Monde, April-June 1977.40
Rugman, A.M., 'Transfer Pricingin theCanadian Petroleum Industry,' in A.M. Rugman and L
Eden, eds., MultinationaLr and Ti nsferPrithzg, New Yoric St Martin's Press, 1985.
Savin, N.E., 'The Bonferroni and the Scheffé Multiple Comparison Procedures,' Review of
Economic Studies, 1980.
-Smith,J.L, 'International Petroleum Taxation: Reasons for Instability,' in J.G. Rowse, ed.,
WorldEnerv Markets: Coping with Instability, Calgary:IAEE, 1987.
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations, Foreign Tar Credits Claime4 by
U.S. Petroleum Companies, Hearings before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs
Subcommittee, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1977.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. DirectInvestmentAbroath
1982 Benchmark Suiwy Data, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985.
Vaitsos, C.V., Intercountry Income Distribution and Tran.snational Enterprises, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1974.
Weiner, RI., ModeLs of Contracting Trading and Spot Markets, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1986.
Williamson, O.E. Markets and Hierarchies, New Yoric Free Press, 1975.